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TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA FOUO No. 636









# U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE

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# TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CABORA BASSA ELECTRICITY SUPPLY TO SOUTH AFRICA UNINTERRUPTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Feb 79 p 530

[Text] An AFP dispatch from Johannesburg, dated 15 February, indicates that South Africa has accepted a Portuguese request for discussions on the giant Cabora Bassa hydroelectric complex, following information that reported problems in the completion of the project.

Pik Botha, the South African foreign affairs minister, stated that the Portuguese request was concerned with an agreement between the two countries dating from the colonial period, which provides for a supply of electricity from the dam to South Africa. He did not specify where the discussion with Portugal would take place, nor on what level.

In a report from Lisbon, the South African radio said that problems, due in particular to the "bureaucracy" and to the strained relations between Portugal and Mozambique, had caused a delay in the completion of the last stage of the complex, which was planned for this year. One of the problems, according to the radio, involves a loan of several million dollars, to which South Africa is committed.

The South African radio reports were received with surprise in the country, especially by the South African Electricity Corporation (Escom), which has been receiving power from Cabora Bassa since March 1977 over a 1,414-km long high-voltage line, the longest in the world.

A spokesman for Escom stated that it had encountered no problems at all up to now. "We buy electricity from the Cabora Bassa consortium, and the supply has been uninterrupted up to now," he said. The power supplied by the Mozambique dam amounts to 1,470 MW, and makes up 9.8 percent of South Africa's needs at present.

The consortium that financed the Cabora Bassa dam, which is known to be the largest dam in Africa, for more than 500 million dollars, includes Portuguese, South African, French, and German companies.

The rise to power of a revolutionary regime in Maputo when Mozambique became independent in June 1975 made South Africa fear a questioning of the agreements

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reached during the Potruguese colonial period. Actually, the pragmatic attitude of the Maputo leaders allowed the continuation of economic relations between the two countries, especially with respect to Cabora Bassa. Thus a delegation from Mozambique was in Pretoria last month to discuss the fate of some 30,000 black miners from Mozambique who are employed in South African mines.

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ANGOLA

CUBAN PRESENCE NO OBSTACLE TO BRAZIL-ANGOLA RELATIONS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Mar 79 p 830

[Excerpt] Thanks to Angolan oil, commercial trade with Brazil should increase.

The Angolan mission headed by Mr Roberto de Almeida, minister of foreign trade, which visited Brazil on the occasion of the inauguration of the new president of the republic, Mr Joao Baptista Firueiredo (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, No 1740 16 Mar 79 p 711), ended on 21 March the discussions that it had with the new administration in Brazil.

Mr de Almeida has specified that Angola and Brazil were interested in the reopening of the route between Rio de Janeiro and Luanda by the Brazilian airline Varig. He also indicated that the Angolan commercial delegation's stay in Brazil was a "ground clearing" mission, charged with studying potential areas of cooperation and trade between the two countries, and was not for the purpose of signing any agreement.

The head of the delegation stated that his country would probably open a diplomatic residence in Brasilia before the end of the year (Brazil already has an ambassador to Luanda).

The Angolan minister's other statements were of political nature. Mr de Almeida appreciated that the Brazilian chancellor, Mr Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, was able to reassure him by indicating that Brazil had no intention of taking part in any South Atlantic defense pact, as the Angolan government had feared.

Discussing the presence of Cuban soldiers in Angola, the minister assumed that this presence should not prevent Brazil from reestablishing relations with Cuba. "There are some North American soldiers in Cuba (on the Guantanamo naval base) and that does not prevent Brazil from maintaining relations with the United States," he pointed out. On the other hand, Mr de Almeida reaffirmed that the Cuban soldiers "will remain in Angola as long as necessary," while adding, "we are not robots under the control of the Cubans, who entered the country at Angolan request."

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After Brasilia, the Angolan delegation went to Sao Paulo on 21 March, where it remained until the 23rd, before leaving for Salvador de Bahia to visit some petrochemical installations there. It should be back to Rio de Janeiro, then on to Luanda on 25 March.

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ANGOLA

AREAS OF POSSIBLE ANGOLA-BRAZIL COOPERATION DETAILED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 16 Apr 79 p 38

[Article by Augusta Conchiglia: "Brazilian Cooperation"]

[Excerpts] The opening of Brazilian policy toward Africa explains the cordial welcome given to the Angolan delegation. Fruitful exchanges could be the result.

In March an important Angolan delegation headed by Roberto de Almeida, minister of foreign trade, went to Brazil on the occasion of the investiture of General Figuereido. It was a question of studying the possibilities for cooperation between the two countries. "I believe that we have fully attained our objectives," stated Roberto de Almeida on his return to Luanda. "We were able to study those sectors that interested us and all the authorities whom we met showed us friendliness and understanding. The prospects for cooperation between Brazil and Angola are promising." On his part, General Figuereida said to the Angolan minister that he wished to see relations strengthened between Brazil and Portuguese speaking African countries and with all the countries on the continent.

#### New Channels

It seems that the volume of exchanges between the two countries soon will greatly increase, and that cooperation will not be confined to business only, but will also be active in the sectors (where it will be facilitated by a common language) such as technical assistance, vocational training, and education. The Angolan delegation was particularly involved in the following activities:

Agriculture: The delegates studied the Brazilian methods of growing soy beans (little grown in Angola), corn, and coffee. For this last product, some Brazilian experts are to come soon to Angola to treat the diseases that the coffee plants have in some provinces, and to prevent further disease.

Animan husbandry: Brazilian live stock could be imported to restore the Angolan herds that were heavily depleted in the war of liberation.

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Sugar and alcohol: The Brazilian sugar industry could reequip Angola's sugar industry and could construct new factories where technicians would be trained by Brazilian engineers.

Fishing and shipping: The delegation witnessed the launching of the first of twenty fishing boats ordered by Angola from a shippard in Rio. It is possible that the Angolan merchant marine can be outfitted in Brazil.

Aeronautics: Brazil could furnish some small airplanes for crop dusting (spreading of pesticides), others for prospecting for natural resources, and still others for patroling the coasts. Brazil could also help with airport construction.

Automobiles and railway materials: The Brazilian branches of the great multinational companies which manufacture cars and trucks (Volkswagen, Scania) and railway materials (Plessy, Ericsson) are offering financing for the purchase of their products. Scania could even open an assembly plant in Angola.

Education: Luanda plans to recruit large numbers of Brazilian teachers for primary, secondary, and higher education to partially alleviate the shortage of teachers. This year in the primary grades alone there will be 1,500,000 Angolan students.

Indeed, the radical differences which a short time ago were dividing the regimes of the two countries constituted a major obstacle to cooperation. Today, undeniably, Brasılia's foreign policy has changed, at least with respect to Africa. A beginning is possible and the differences can be overcome. Nevertheless, Roberto de Almeida was determined to make certain that Brazil definitely renounced the South Atlantic pact. The Brazilian minister of foreign affairs has given him guarantees on this point and reminded him that his country had always vigorously condemned apartheid in all international instances.

The Brazilian press, on the whole, expressed sympathy with the delegates from the People's Republic of Angola, but some newspapers insinuated that if Luanda was approaching Brazil, it was to buy arms and to ask for military instructors to be sent to Angola. This was categorically denied by Roberto de Almeida.

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ANGOLA

#### BRIEFS

OPEC ADHERENCE VIEWED--Mr Jorge de Morais is presently studying the possibility of Angola's joining OPEC. According to the minister, Angola's entry into the organization would consolidate its international relations. To be an OPEC member, a petroleum producing country must be a petroleum exporter. That is the case with Angola which produces almost 9,000,000 tons per year. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 16 Apr 79 p 40] 9374

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BOTSWANA

#### BRIEFS

FRG DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE--West Germany has forgone reimbursement by Botswana for its development aid, which has now increased to 61.8 million marks. A communique dated 22 March from the Ministry of Economic Cooperation in Bonn stated that Mr Rainer Offergel, minister of economic cooperation, has signed an accord to this effect in Gaberone. On the other hand it is indicated that Botswana could spend 27 million marks of West German aid this year, mostly for the reinforcement of its railway and highway systems. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Mar 79 p 829] 9374

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GABON

BRIEFS

TRADE WITH BRITAIN--According to British foreign trade statistics, Gabonese exports to Great Britain had a value of 4.4 million pounds in 1978 (compared with 3.2 million in 1977), while 7.72 million pounds worth of British products were imported into Gabon (compared with 5.6 million in 1973). As part of the economic relations between Gabon and Great Britain, the company Gabon-Panalrique SA was recently formed in Libreville; the Richard Haas company of London has a share in it. We recall that a delegation from the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce recently visited Gabon (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 9 Feb 79 p 325). Gabon very recently ordered from London 17 VHF radio sets, worth around 27 million francs CFA; they are manufactured by Plessey-Radar, and will be installed in the country's various airports -- especially Libreville, Port-Gentil, Lambarene, and Oyem -- in the next 3 years. In the field of agricultural industry, the British firm Taylor Woodrow is participating in the construction of a vegetable oil refinery. It is providing equipment that includes three generators, metal framework, construction materials, and manufacturing equipment, which is already at the site. The West German company Hobum Africa is the promoter of this operation, which should permit two brands of vegetable oil to be launched on the Gabonese market in the first half of 1979. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Feb 79 p 519 3429

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GUINEA

#### BRIEFS

COUNTRY'S NEEDS EVALUATED—A delegation from ECTI [International Exchanges and Technical Consultations] visited Guinea from 6 to 23 March. It included Jacques Clere, an agronomical engineer, and Jacques Godeaut, an economist; its purpose was to estimate Guinea's present needs in the areas of rural economy, agricultural and food industry, small and medium-size industries, technical education, and professional training. A report presenting the conclusions of this exploratory mission is being written; it is intended for the members of ECTI (23 rue de la Sourdiere, 75001 Paris, telephone 261-18-80). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Mar 79 p 810] 8429

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GUINEA-BISS AU

CABRAL IN BRUSSELS: GUINEA-BISSAU PROTECTS FOREIGN INVESTMENTS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Mar 79 p 810

[Text] As we reported in our issue No 1740 of 16 March, p 688, President Luis Cabral of Guinea-Bissau stayed in Brussels from 14 to 18 March, the first 3 days on an official visit and the last 2 on a private visit. In the Belgian capital, he had meetings with Foreign Affairs Minister Henri Simonet and was received by King Baudouin and by Roy Jenkins, chairman of the European Commission.

Guinea-Bissau obtained 400,000 accounting units (1 uc = 1.37 dollars) from the EEC to finance 50 wells in the most disadvantaged region of the country, the Gabu region. In addition, Guinea-Bissau will receive 650,000 uc under regional cooperation, for two economic and technical studies related to road connections between Bissau, Gambia, and Dakar, and Bissau and Conakry.

Speaking at a Brusssels press conference about the renewal of the Lome Convention, which links 54 countries of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) -- including Guinea-Bissau -- to the 9 EEC countries, Mr Cabral thought that the two partners would find an "adequate formula" concerning respect for human rights, a formula that could be put in the preamble of the future Lome Convention.

Moreover, Mr Cabral recalled that Guinea-Bissau was favorable to the protection of foreign investments," an idea to which the EEC countries are especially sensitive.

The Guinea-Bissau president was also pleased that two former Portuguese colonies, Angola and Pozambique, had already been admitted as observers to the negotiations in progress for the renewal of the future Lome Convention. "I hope," he said, "that this will be a first step towards having them join soon."

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MADAGASCAR

# BRIEFS

CUBANS IN TANANARIVE--Eighty-one Cubans have arrived in Tananarive to form the framework of the Malagasy police and train MiG pilots. Text/Paris PARIS MATCH in French 11 May 79 p 43/

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MOZAMBIQUE

#### BRIEFS

BEIRA PORT ENLARGEMENT--The Mozambique government has just decided to enlarge the port of Beira, which should become, because of a long range program, one of the most important ports in eastern Africa. One of the objectives of the Mozambique plan is to install the necessary facilities to accommodate ships of 40,000 tons and larger. For the present, the port can only accommodate ships up to 25,000 tons. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 16 Apr 79 p 40] 9374

USSR-MOZAMBIQUE AGREEMENT SIGNED--The wife of President Samora Machel, Mrs Graca Machel, signed, as minister of education, a cultural and scientific agreement with the soviet ambassador to Mozambique, Mr P. S. Eviscov. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Mar 79 p 830] 8364

EEC EMERGENCY DONATION--EEC (European Economic Community) has granted emergency aid of 80,000 monetary units (1 uc = Fr 5.7) to Mozambique in order to carry out a relief program for the victims of the recent cyclone, it is learned from a source close to the European commission. The aid will be used to buy provisions, blankets, and agricultural tools. It will be distributed by the non-governmental organization Cairtas Germanica. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Mar 79 p 830] 9374

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NIGER

PRESENT DAY NIGER'S URANIUM DEPOSITS DISCUSSED

Uranium Only One Factor

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Apr 79 pp 37-39, 41

[Text] The regime of Col Seyni Kountche is getting ready to celebrate the fifth anniversary of its ascent to power next 15 April. Five years marked by two severely repressed coups d'etat are coming to a close in an economic situation full of hope. It is true that the uranium boom accounts for a great deal of this. However, the rigorous management of the leadership team also deserves to be noted. Will the Army seize this occasion to erase all the aftereffects of the April 1974 coup d'etat and bring about a national reconciliation? This is the question that everyone is asking. The reply will soon be known. Join us after the festivities that the town of Dosso is to host.

After 10 hours of driving to the east of Niamey, the brush-covered savanna suddenly gives way to a quiet little town burned by the sun, overshadowed here and there by the high foliage of the cailcedrats [translation unknown], mimosas and flamboyants: Dosso. Up to now, this conglomeration of 10,000 inhabitants, languishing under a veil of dust-laden mist, seems inexorably condemned to decadence. It lives only on its glorious past.

In fact, Dosso was the cradle of the Djermas, one of the two principal ethnic groups that inhabit Niger. The white palace with the blue and yellow figurines of the reigning family, the Djermakoyes, who succeeded each other from father to son at the head of that decadent royal house, is still the heart of the city. However, here is Dosso getting ready to write another glorious title over its escutcheons. According to the principle of rotation, it is this city which is to host, on 15 April 1979, the festivities marking the fifth anniversary of the ascent of the Army to power (15 April 1974). Battalion Commander Adamu Harouna, prefect of Dosso, an officer with the carriage of an athlete, few words and abrupt gestures, directed with an iron hand the construction of the necessary infrastructures for welcoming and hosting nearly 2,000 guests. On this occasion, the authorities wished to show proof of the change that has taken place in the country under the aegis of the Army.

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It is true that the political landscape of Niger has changed a great deal in five years. The presidential palace in Niamey, an imposing edifice whose Soudano-Mauresque architecture is reflected in the waters of the river, is now only the shadow of itself. Formerly the seat of a feverish activity, it is now totally deserted. Outside of the rare official receptions that he offers there, the current president, Colonel Seyni Kountche, obstinately camps in the official residence of the chief of staff of the Niger Army, while the palace remains closed and forbidden to the public. In order to show this very clearly, armed soldiers dressed in short uniforms, nonchalant and debonnaire, watch before its entrance. In the garage, dozens of Mercedes (including two Mercedes 600s), unused after the events of April 1974, very gently gather dust, abandoned to the effects of time.

The building of the former National Assembly is not unaffected. Certainly, the deputies of the former regime were sent back to their professional occupations. The studio apartments which served them as residences during the sessions have been closed. Because, a neighbour tells us, "certain dignitaries of the new regime had a tendency to change the deputies' residence into a house of assignation." However, the building still houses the services of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Battalion Commander Moumoumi Djermakoie Adamou, the foreign minister, has taken the armchair of ex-president Boubou Hama. The official residence that the latter used to occupy on the river-bank today serves as a reception hall for the members of the government. As for the immense assembly hall where the deputies huddled together, from time to time it serves as a meeting place for cadre conferences.

The men who presided over the destinies of Niger for 15 years have all left the front of the stage. Furthermore, all of the country's influential political personages were arrested during the night of 14-15 April 1974. Pulled from their beds while sound asleep, those dignitaries were first transported in jeeps to the Tondibia Cadet Camp, some ten kilometers from Niamey, and then for the most part transferred the next day to the city of the Entente Council, not far from the French embassy. It was from there they were taken to different military camps in the interior (Agadez, Zinder, Tahoua, etc.) as political detainees.

Political detainees who, under the African sun, did not have a great deal to complain about. Housed in relatively comfortable villas customarily reserved for officers, the dignitaries of the former regime led a life rather of men on retreat inside the military camps than a prisoner's life. Adequately fed, they passed the best part of their time playing cards or billiards or bowling. Some of them got together to talk over their ideas on human destiny, while others, disillusioned, preferred to withdraw into isolation in order to meditate on the fragility of political power. This is unusual in Africa. However, generally they all finally agreed to definitively renounce all political activity once they were freed. This was a promise that they hurried to forget, of course, as soon as they saw once again the light of liberty.

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As for the invalids, they were admitted to the hospital at Niamey. And in cases of complication they were transported to Paris. Some former ministers were thus cared for in the French capital before they were returned to their detention camps. It doesn't matter that certain ones, like Mr Mouddour Zacara, former finance minister, died in detention. As for the others, most of them have today recovered their freedom.

The technocrats promoted by ex-president Diori Hamani were the first ones freed. They were liberated a few months after their arrest, even when they were not returned to their ministerial posts, because they were connected with the leadership of important state corporations or of central administrations. Then it was the turn of the leaders of the RDA (African Democratic Rally, whose former president Diori was the first in line) to breathe the air of liberty.

Leading aside some former deputies and ministers, like Mr Harou Kouka (Public Works) and Leopold Kaziende (National Defense), ex-president Boubou Hama was by far the most illustrious figure. They were freed in small groups and since then they have lived a life of peaceful retirement in Niamey. The only problem is that certain of them, such as Dr Harou Kouka, have not been auth-crized to take up their professions again; and that a man like Mr Boubou Hama, who worked in politics for a quarter of a century, is curiously at present without a roof. He is obliged to live at the house of his son. Should the government of Colonel Kountche abandon those men to their fate? Without aid and without resources!

# Mysterious Fate of Detainees

Certainly not. In view of their advanced ages, there are good chances that, faithful to the African traditions particularly devoted to assistance for the aged, the authorities of Niger will not delay in giving them assistance. In one way or another....

However, other former detainees have not delayed in making their reconversions effective. Thus, the predecessor of Colonel Kountche in the post of chief of staff of the Niger Army, Col Balla Arabe, has devoted himself since his liberation to trade between Maradi and Kono (Nigeria). In the meantime, a half-dozen personalities are still under detention in the company of expresident Hamani Diori. And, with them, some ten militiamen who had particularly distinguished themselves in repression. President Kountche, who has the only decision-making power in this area, categorically refuses to announce the date of their liberation. "I shall not reveal that date to anyone," he told us last March, with an air that was half amusement and half irritation.

Certainly, the chief of state and his comrades in the Supreme Military Council (CMS, the Supreme Organ of the State) hesitate to take that step. It is true that the hostility that some of their compatriots, who were severely tested earlier, continue to cherish toward the leaders of the former regime justifies in part this watchful waiting.

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jostling each other at the Niamey airport before running across each other in the ministerial antechambers. Some Western banks such as the National Bank of Paris (French) and the City Bank (American), drawn by the odor of royalties, are applying for the opening of agencies on the spot. The petroleum companies are not idle. Technicians from Conoco, Texaco and Esso are prospecting without [missing page]

Photo Caption

Victims of Austerity

In Niger, the austerity preached by President Kountche is not an empty word. This is born out by the fact that the Mercedes belonging to the fleet of the former Hamani Diori regime have been put up on blocks or sold to private citizens. The ministers now roll down the streets of Niamey only in model 504's and the service chiefs in 2 CV's. The latter have rights to only 4 liters of gasoline daily. Contrary to what happens in other African countries, here no one plays games with playboys and plutocrats!

Uranium: Modern Gold Rush

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Apr 79 pp 50, 52

[Text] If the soil of Niger is poor, the subsoil is on the contrary very rich. Uranium, cassiterite, phosphates, coal, iron, copper... and perhaps oil: so many deposits exploited or still untouched which sweep away the opinion of a colonial governor for whom Niger was "a country of sands, without a future."

A recent industry (1971), uranium mining is a trump card for the country. An oxygen tank, delivered in the nick of time, it is the symbol of the economic take-off and of the beginning of Niger's modernization. The reasonably assured resources come to 74,000 tons and the supplementary estimated resources would probably amount to 86,000 tons. At the close of 1978 production was calculated at 2,200 tons. With rapidly increasing world demand, and the ore prices being regularly reevaluated (in 1979: 24,500 francs CFA [African Financial Community] a kilo), the effects of the uranium exploitation on Niger's economy are for that reason very important.

The uranium deposits, which were discovered by the French Atomic Energy Commission [CEA], are found principally along the southern and western borders of the Air Massif (northern part of the country). The first deposit to be exploited dates from the beginning of the 1970s. The Air Mining Company [SOMAIR], created in 1968, exploits with a strip mine at Arlit (250 kilometers south-southeast of Agadez) the ore inside a perimeter measuring 6 kilometers by 3. At present, two deposits are known: Arlit, which is exploited (reserves: 10,000 tons) and Ariege, whose discovery dates from 1976 (reserves: 10,000 tons). A third deposit — that of Artois — is now being cored (reserves estimated at between 20,000 and 25,000 tons). In 1978 the production of SOMAIR rose to 1,800 tons approximately (1,441 tons in 1977)

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and the steady production expected when production has reached its peak will be between 2,000 and 2,500 tons per year. The product is exported as a concentrate of sodium uranate which titrates about 70 percent uranium.

However, since 31 August 1978, a second company, COMINAK (Akouta Mining Company) — created in 1974 — is exploiting an underground mine at Akouta, 10 kilometers southwest of Arlit. The exploitable reserves are on the order of 44,000 tons. At the end of 1978 production rose to 350 tons of uranium (or 450 tons of magnesium uranate). The objective for 1979 is to reach 1,750 tons and, after 1980, 2,000 to 2,200 tons a year. These two companies — SOMAIR and COMINAK — are soon to be joined by the Mining Company of Tassa N'Taghalgue [SMTT]. This company will exploit the Arni deposit, located four kilometers southwest of Arlit, where the exploitable reserves amount to some 20,000 tons of uranium. The first production could occur in 1981 or 1982.

Other deposits are the objectives of prospecting: permits have been granted to an entire gamut of foreign companies, the state hoping to diversify its partners in the development of its mining industry. Such is the case of the Imouraren deposit, located less than 100 kilometers south of Arlit and where the exploitable reserves are probably on the order of 66,000 tons. And on the horizon for 1985 are the projects of West Afasto (southwest of the Arlit concession), East Afasto (on the eastern border of Arlit), Djado (on the border of the Tibesti massifs) and that of Abokorun-Azelik (see the table).

### **Uranium Production**

Year	Tons of Uranium
Before 1972	410.5
1972	867.0
1973	948.3
1974	1,116.9
1975	1,305.5
1976	1,460,2
1977	1,609.0
1978	2,200.0
	9,917.4

# Capacity for Uranium Production (projected figures)

3,850
4,100
4,300
9,000
9,000
9,000
9,000
9,000

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Large Income from Uranium

At the beginning of the 70's, uranium provided little income for Niger. France was at that time the only master of the game, the participation of the state of Niger in SOMAIR amounting to only 8 percent (it then rose to 16 percent and is 33 percent today). The only purchasing country, France unilaterally fixed the purchase price of the ore and as a counterpart invested an annual compensation on the order of 1 million CFA francs.

Today the situation has turned around. Following new agreements with France, signed in 1974, Niger decides the uranium prices. Every year (between October and December), the sales price is determined by the Niger government, the directors of the SOMAIR and COMINAK companies and the stockholders of those two companies, who are the ones who buy the ore.

The starting point is not a world price because there does not yet exist any uranium "OPEC." However, a de facto rule is determined on the basis of the contracts that are signed throughout the world. The sales price is then fixed between x and y dollars. Starting with those relatively fluid data, Niger and its partners fix the price: 24,500 CFA francs per kilo in 1979 as opposed to 23,500 in 1978 and 20,000 in 1977.

For the ways in which payments are made, a partial payment, called a provisional payment, is now made which corresponds to 80 percent of the value of the delivery determined by the seller's samples. The buyers, who are the SOMAIR and COMINAK stockholders, must pay the invoice in less than two months. During that period, they proceed to a contradictory sampling. After an agreement (which sometimes requires resorting to arbitration), the selling price of the ore is definitively established and the buyers have 45 days -- added to the 2 months -- to pay the balance.

In a few years, uranium has thus become the primary export product of Niger (about 70 percent of all export receipts). The continual increase in production and sales and the constant upward movement of prices permit the country to show appreciable budget receipts. Niger's income under the heading of uranium has thus increased from 400 million CFA francs in 1974 to 4 billion in 1975, then to 7.6 billion in 1976 and 10.5 billion in 1977. Those receipts are increasing in such an impressive way that, over and above the tax on profits, the royalties paid on production and the customs duties paid for exports, Niger -- in its role as owner of 33 percent of the shares of SOMAIR and 31 percent of the shares of COMINAK -- sells its part in production back to its partners.

With a yearly production on the order of 5,000 to 6,000 tons of metallic uranium in the 80's, Niger will become one of the first-rank world producers (in 1978, world production amounted to 30,000 tons). The role that this country will play in providing energy for the industrialized nations can be seen. On the other hand, the covetousness of the industrialized nations with regard to Niger is clearly visible.

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Strong, Structured Army

Thus the memories of the excesses committed by former Interior Minister Diambala Maiga have not been totally effaced from popular memory. It has even happened that the chief of state has received delegations arriving from the interior of the country especially to demand that one or another former dignitary be kept in prison. The reason? Five years after the fall of Mr Hamani Diori's regime, certain citizens of Niger are still calling for revenge.

Nevertheless, everything allows us to believe that the latter group will not stay in prison forever. In spite of the thick veil of mystery that surrounds the debates of the CMS on this painful question, it is still permitted to believe that those unfortunate people will certainly not be long in recovering their freedom. For example, Mr Djibo Bakari, former leader of the Sawaba, who was arrested in 1975. Today, more than ever, the Niger Army needs to erase from its memory the themes and the stigmata of its April 1974 coup d'etat. In a country where inflexibly tolerant spirits are rather inclined toward indulgence, if not forgetfulness and pardon, than toward revenge and the humiliation or the gratuitous putting to death of one's opponent, public opinion understands less and less the indefinite prison residence of Diori, Djibo and their companions. Certainly, people are pleased, even proud to know that they are well treated (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No. 807). "We are not barbarians in Niger," a young official told us, although his family had for all of that suffered under the former regime. However, in a general way, everyone would prefer to declare: "Among us there are no political prisoners."

The Army seems more and more disposed to turn the page as it considers itself stronger and better structured. The companions of the first hour who had shown some slight inclination to rebel against the advances of the regime have been pitilessly eliminated. Such was the case of Major Sani Souna Sido, who had the reputation of being the man who really overthrew Diori. Arrested for plotting in July 1975, he was detained in the Agudez military camp until he died in 1978 of the aftereffects of an epileptic seizure.

In March of 1976 it was the turn of Battalion Commander Moussa Bayere and Captain Sidi Mohamed to attempt a coup d'etat. At the head of the cadets of the Tondibia camp, they had no trouble in surrounding the staff, from which they tried to rally the officer corps to their cause. But they failed not far from there, before the residence of the chief of state. Arrested, they were tried at the same time as several civilians, including Mr Ahmed Mouddour, the secretary general of the Confederation of Unions of Niger, and Mr Idrissa Boube, director of the National Secret Police. All were condemned to death and shot in a rather expeditious manner. Other recalcitrant companions were to know a kinder fate. Such was the case of Lieutenant Cyrille, who is still in prison, and above all that of Major Idrissa Arouna, who, after being long considered as the number two man of the regime, suddenly fell into disgrace. He was appointed several months ago to represent his country in Peking.

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"Power Not a Game"

All of these terrifying activities have had the effect of making the CMS, and with it the officer corps, more coherent and more solidly ranged behind their leader, Col Seyni Kountche. Furthermore, the latter today seems confident and more assured. Certainly, with his pharp features, his severe and penetrating look, the chief of state of Niger still exudes ansterity and correctness. Five years of exercising the supreme power have not changed him in either his physical appearance or his habits. Lean body, energetic gestures and his strict military habit bear witness, if there is any need for it, that he has not gained a kilo. Up and about every day at the first glimmerings of dawn to begin an overflowing schedule which is not completed until very late that evening, Seyni Kountche flees from trivia and denies himself any distractions.

This rigorous life repels and upsets even his closest collaborators. It is reported that some of his relatives, unhappy about his behavior, no longer speak to him. For those among them who are so brave as to knock at his door, he orders in a dry and peremptory way: "Let them come to see me in the village during my vacation." As he does not give himself more than a few rare moments of leisure each year, this reply is equivalent to a declaration that he will not receive them. When one of his close relatives, an employee in his government, had been compromised in an affair of deviation of funds, he took pains to demand the most severe punishment for the guilty person. Such is the appearance of the man who has been presiding for five years without drum or trumpet but with a faultless rigor over the destinies of Niger. Was he aware of the size of the task before he rose to the supreme power? "I knew," he replies, that "power was not a game, but a burden and a responsibility that it was necessary to prepare for with rigor and application."

# Development, Social Justice

On the other hand, the chief of state has now conquered the timidity and the clumsiness of the staff officer. By the tone of his voice as well as by his manners and his gestures, one feels the presence of a confident man, sure of himself and perfectly at ease in his role. Even if, in the course of the conversation, he shows that he has not entirely lost his proud and touchy side, nor even the suspicious mania of the military man, he makes a visible effort to overcome those handicaps. He seeks to put his conversation partner at ease and lead him to share the contained passion which entirely devours him: the development of his country with unity and social justice.

This is a subject that is particularly in style in the salons of Niamey. The uranium boom leaves no one indifferent. Everyone, and not only in Niamey, knows furthermore that thanks to its rich mining potential, this country will become one of the most prosperous in Africa by the end of the next decade. Which means that the citizens of Niger are now being particularly courted. Businessmen, experts and financiers show up from all directions,

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The result is that the authorities are practising a "prudent realism." The rate of production is wisely regulated and the revenues taken from the ore are devoted to the development of the country. The sales feed a National Investment Fund [FNI] which grants priority to the development of the rural sector, to health and to education, as well as to purchasing state participation in the capital of diverse companies.

Other Mineral Resources

However, mining prospects are not limited to uranium.

The production of cassiterite (tin ore), at El Mecki, Taraoudji, Timia, Agolak and Guissat has been held at the same level since 1974: 117.5 tons of concentrate in 1976 compared to 127.5 tons in 1975 and 126 tons in 1974. Exports, specifically to Belgium and Nigeria, rose to 110 tons in 1976 compared to 120 tons in 1974. The exploitation of two coal deposits, located at Anou-Araren, 50 kilometers northwest of Agadez, began under the aegis of the Niger Coal Company of Anou-Araren [SONICHAR]. The reserves are estimated at nearly five million tons (but of mediocre quality) and they should serve for producing the necessary electricity to supply the uranium plants at Air and the city of Agadez.

The prospective coal production is calculated at 120,000 tons in 1982, and it will be raised to 275,000 tons in 1987.

Close to the mine a steam generating plant with two generators of 16 megawatts each is under construction. It will produce 120 million kilowats. The works of uncovering the deposit were begun at the end of 1977 and they will be completed in 1979.

Some calcium phosphate deposits have been surveyed 150 kilometers to the south of Niamey. They are part of a "phosphate province" covering Benin, Niger and Upper Volta, inside a perimeter which corresponds to the national park of the W [translation unknown]. The coring campaigns are being carried out by the BRGM (Bureau of Geological and Mining Research) in connection with ONAREM (National Office of Mineral Resources). Reserves amounting to 500 million tons are spoken of.

Indications of Petroleum

The iron deposit at Say and its exploitation -- about 650 million tons titrating 51 to 53 percent iron -- is currently under study. The study is being conducted by the ONUDI (Organization of the United Nations for Industrial Development) at the request of the Niger-Nigerian Cooperation Commission.

Some petroleum has been found in the Tin Touma well (N'Guimi district). Four groups of companies: Texaco-Esso, Texaco-Esso-Global, Conoco-Shell and Niger Sun Oil-Phillips Oil Global, began in fact in 1975 to carry out positive drilling. The authorities, however, are remaining prudent and discreet.

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Research is continuing, a permit has been granted to ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France] and Esso has begun a new drilling campaign. Whatever the reserves may be, between now and 1989 Niger could have enough fuel available at least for its own consumption. This resource, added to uranium, would make Niger into an economically rich country and would reduce to zero its imports of hydrocarbons which every year amount to about four billion CFA francs.

Akouta: Second Uranium Mine

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Apr 79 p 53

[Text] Seen from the air, Akouta in no way breaks the uniformity of the desert. Located in the heart of the northern part of the African continent, on the southern boundaries of the Hoggar and connected by tracks to the closest agglomerations (Iferouane: 120 kilometers; Agadez: 250 kilometers), this spot is the opposite of Arlit -- which is a greenish crater, a living rent in that sterile zone. Here, the only things visible are a factory building and the urban zone of Akodan, which is being completed. However, there is a connection between Akouta and Arlit: uranium.

Reserves: 44,000 tons

For the underground deposit of Akouta, the adventure begins later than that of Arlit. Following studies on the prospect of radioactive minerals carried out jointly by the French Commission for Atomic Energy [CEA], URANIGER [expansion unknown] -- later dissolved and replaced by the National Office of Mineral Resources [ONEREM] -- and Japan (OURD: Overseas Uranium Resources Development), a preliminary report was submitted favorable to the exploitation of the site. This report was presented to the authorities in 1974. It estimated the reserves at 44,000 tons of an ore whose assays vary from 2 to 5 kilos a ton. In addition, the ore contains molybdenum.

On 12 August of the same year, a company was constituted. This was COMINAK (Mining Company of Akouta), where the state of Niger, the CEA and OURD arc found side by side. In 1975 Spain (ENUSA [National Uranium Enterprise, Inc.]) will join them, having bought a part of CEA's shares.

The project was started, and it was finished on 1 August 1978. The underground mine is near to a factory manufacturing sulphuric acid (45,650 tons will be produced per year) which has been operational since 1 January 1978. The first shipment of magnesium uranate left Akouta on 31 August 1978.

The remarkable aspect of how this deposit was put under exploitation was that the periods of time between the first studies and the effective exploitation were practically nil. A delay of only two months was observed! "A slowdown due to the defectiveness of certain vats, which had to be entirely redone, and chiefly due to the problems of shipping the material from Cotonou," the secretary general of COMINAK indicates. Moreover, expenses committed by

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the Treasury between 1978 and 1978, established at 43 billion CFA francs, were raised to 45.5 billion. A financing which was effected in three ways:

Starting with the company's own capital (the social capital of 3.5 million CFA francs and advances made by the stockholders, which amounted to 7 billion); by medium-term credits agreed on by the banks and guaranteed by the stockholders; finally, by two credits for a total value of 9.9 billion yen, invested by OURD (Japan).

Two Thousand to 2,200 Tons Yearly

Today, 1,191 people work at Akouta (35 engineers including 2 from Niger; 185 skilled workers including 18 from Niger; 971 laborers from Niger). By the end of 1979 the number of jobs will rise to 1,574 and in 1980 to 1,750. Between 31 August and 31 December 1978, 350 tons of uranium were produced there. That production will rise to 1,700 tons in 1979 and will reach a sustained annual rate of 2,000 to 2,200 tons beginning in 1980.

#### Insufficient Roads

If the people responsible for COMINAK are satisfied with the functioning of the mine, they complain nevertheless about the poorness of the routes of communication. The Akouta deposit is 1,100 kilometers from Niamey and 3,200 kilometers from the port of Cotonou. Ninety percent of the transportation of material is taken care of by surface routes. This does not happen without constant problems: a break in loading (ship to Cotonou, then railroad between Cotonou and Parakou, and then a road), bad roads which are cut during the rainy season, long delays for customs inspection in the port of Cotonou.... Also, the average time for a shipment between a supplier and Akouta is about four months.

The volume and the weight of the transported material limit the use of aerial transport. "Only in a case of emergency or for material of small size do we call upon airplanes," a representative of COMINAK insists. "And even if we wanted to transport heavier and bulkier freight, we could not do so. Air Niger still does not have any large cargo planes but only some DC-4s and DC-6s," he adds.

There is still one hope: the uranium road, 700 kilometers long, financed by the mining partners, which will connect Tahoua-Agadez and Arlit.

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NIGERIA

#### BRIEFS

TIN PRODUCTION DECLINE--The decrease in production and earnings from tin worsened last year compared to the two preceding years, even to the extent of significantly affecting planned budget receipts. From 5,251 tons in 1976 and 4,875 tons in 1977, production in 1978 is estimated to have dropped to only 4,388 and this allowing for an improvement in the final quarter, since the figure for the first 9 months was 2,804. As for earnings, from 14.6 million naira in 1976 and 9.5 million in 1977, they-are estimated to have fallen sharply to only 6.2 million in 1978. Some recovery should be evident this year with the opening of new mines. The principal producer by a large margin continues to be Amalgamated Tin Mines, Ltd., following in decreasing order by Ex-Lands, Ltd.; Bisichi-Jantar (Nig), Ltd.; Gold and Base Metal Mines Ltd.; Kaduna Syndicate; United Tin Mines, Ltd.; and Vectis Tin Mines, Ltd. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Feb 79 p 515]

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RHODESIA

ELECTIONS OBSERVER SEES UK INTEREST IN MUZOREWA SUPPORT

London THE GUARDIAN in English 30 Apr 79 p 12 LD

[Article by Lord Onslow, Anglo-Rhodesian Society Observer at Rhodesian Elections: "Why Britain Should Support Muzorewa"]

[Text] When Ian Douglas Smith went into rebellion in 1965 he did it solely because of the interests of the white Rhodesian community as he saw it. Britain must therefore look, at the recent Zimbabwe/Rhodesian elections solely in the lights of her own interests. I suggest those interests and those of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia can be best sustained by, first an encouragement of and then the legalization of the government of Abel Muzorewa.

It is in Britain's interests that there is a settled prosperous and thriving Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. This can only be achieved by black/white cooperation. Muzorewa has seen the chaos and darkness of other parts of black Africa and he does not like what he has seen. He is not particularly enamoured of the entrenched clauses in the constitution but let us remember that of Canada can only be changed by amendment of the British North America Act.

He would undoubtedly prefer more rapid black advancement in the military, police, judiciary and civil service but, as he definitely wants the whites to stay, he has compromised. The white under 40s are much more committed and much more prepared to accept black government than their elders.

The elections themselves certainly involved government terror and over zealous persuasion. Certainly white farmers and employers encouraged their employees to vote and took them to the booths. There was even special government instruction for 35,000 domestic servants in Salisbury from the election commission. There were Africans locked up and charged for saying don't vote. Of course there were tribesmen being escorted to the polls by auxiliaries armed with rocket launchers and AK47s.

There were even persistent reports of terrorists urging people to vote and auxiliaries urging them not to. All of this does not invalidate the

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fact that hundreds of thousands of blacks went, willingly, excitedly and keerly, to vote. I know of no English woman who would walk 20 kilometers to vote carrying a baby on her back and a kettle on her head, then have to sit for hours waiting at the polling station patiently breast feeding her baby, vote and then return.

It cannot surely be held that because the Patriotic Front boycotted the elections they are not valid. When the northern Ireland border referendum was boycotted by the Roman Catholic population was that declared invalid? I never heard it said. Are Australian elections invalid because it is a finable offence not to vote?

In spite therefore of all the imperfections of this election, and there are others I have not mentioned, it was as free and as fair as was reasonable in the circumstances.

Now will the war be wound down as a result and if so what can the next government do to encourage it? Zimbabwe/Rhodesia has done its bit and now it is up to the chancelleries of the Western world. Time is not on the side of patient diplomacy. The U.S. Congress is already making noises about unilaterally lifting sanctions.

If Mrs Thatcher gets into power I would suggest that, if Lord Boyd's report is favorable--I emphasize I have not discussed it with him--then she would find a sanction renewal order in November impossible to put through the commons without labor votes. Will she try?

Then, of course, there is the queen's visit to Lusaka in August. All of these are complications. I suggest that, after 3 May, the new government sends to Zimbabwe/Rhodesia a high ranking politicio diplomat who can go unofficially to help and encourage the Muzorewa government in the ways of the outside world. (It is difficult to imagine how insular the people are) and to try to help him deliver the first fruits of majority rule to the blacks.

London must accept Zimbabwe/Rhodesia reps here. They must of course not be accredited diplomats but any sensible cover will do. Secondly if the Muzorewa government is seen to be succeeding, London must mount a concerted diplomatic effort in the rest of the world especially Europe. New Delhi, Toronto, Washington and one major black African state.

Kenneth Kaunda needs 450,000 tons of maize, Machel's people are starving and how much help did Nyerere have with the overthrow of Amin? This offers diplomatic scope in black Africa. The idle shorthand of Patriotic Front disguises a desperate and jealously uneasy alliance of two guerrilla armies which do not combine their targets and plans, do not cooperate with each other, but certainly on occasions fight each other.

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If Muzorewa succeeds in the next few months, black Africans will back a winner and the guerrillas could filter in from the bush. This will allow a 10 percent growth rate, the lifting of sanctions and the legislation of the regime. If this happens the blacks will have more and more control over their lives and economy providing a growing standard of loving for the tribesmen and a beacon for the rest of Africa. If that does happen then alliances will be reversed and I can see a Zimbabwe-Rhodesian/Nigerian leadership of black Africa, the further isolation of South Africa and the confinement of Russia to the poorer parts of Africa.

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RHODESIA

UK OBSERVERS REPORT INTIMIDATION IN ELECTIONS

London THE OBSERVER in English 29 Apr 79 p 8 LD

[Report by Colin Legum: "Rhodesia Poll 'Too One-sided'"]

[Text] The fairness of the Rhodesian elections is seriously challenged in a report now being completed for the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Human Rights. It will be presented to the British Government and the American Congress.

Although the report is still in draft form, its two authors, Lord Chitnis and Eileen Subworth, have shown me the documentary evidence on which they have relied for their finding that extensive intimidation was used by the authorities to produce the 64 percent turn-out among black Rhodesian voters. They acknowledge that intimidation was also used by the guerrillas.

Lord Chitnis, who is best known for his work as the Liberal Party's election organizer, said that the many observers who had found that the Rhodesian elections were a fair test of African opinion had possibly looked only at the actual mechanics of the voting procedures at the polling stations, rather than at what went on before the voters got to the booths.

"Even if it were true that everything was fair and above board at the polling booths, what kind of an election result can be expected when only one side of the case was presented to the electorate?," asked Lord Chitnis.

He said that the test of acceptability demanded by the six British principles for recognition of Rhodesia's independence included a requirement that a majority of all Rhodesians should show themselves to be in favor of the actual terms of the settlement.

"But that," he said, "was not the issue put before the country's black voters--although white Rhodesians had previously been allowed to express their views on that issue in a separate referendum.

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"All that the black electorate was asked to do was to choose among candidates of parties supporting the new constitution," Lord Chitnis added. "Nobody had a chance of saying whether he approved of the terms for independence."

He pointed out that there was no chance for anybody to state the case against the settlement--either in the press or radio, or through election speeches.

While this absence of a clear choice on the central issue will be the major point that will be made in the parliamentary committee's report, it will also detail cases of military and other pressures to get blacks to vote.

One extensive method of electorial coercion was through white employers. The report will reproduce copies of instructions sent by the national election directorate to all white farmers and householders telling them how they could go about ensuring a high percentage poll.

Farmers were told in one such directive that, apart from explaining the elections and helping to dispel their employees' fears, it would be helpful, where possible, to "actually go to the polls with them."

The human rights' observers have detailed cases of white employers bringing their workers to the polling stations in trucks and cars. They also report specific instances of workers being threatened with dismissal if they refused to vote.

Lord Chitnis was given affidavits by black teachers who were arrested for refusing to act as polling officers. His evidence includes a confidential directive to teachers warning them that if they refuse to act as polling officers they would be liable to a fine of F\$500 (717 pounds) or six months imprisonment, or both.

Among the specific cases of intimidation presented to the observers were the following:

In the Shabani district, eight lorry loads of security troops came into a tribal trust area on 16 April, pursued fleeing villagers, damaged their houses, and said they were being punished for being "uncooperative." On the following day, the soldiers returned and transported the villagers to Msipani polling station.

In the Buhere tribal trust area, 20 lorries of soldiers came to the area and warned the people to "go and vote or we will bomb your homes."

In the Seke area, the auxiliary army of Bishop Muzorewa's UANC, went from village to village with guns, beating up people and forcing them at gunpoint to go to the polls.

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In the Mrewa area, buses were stopped by soldiers and those who had not voted were taken off the bus and taken to vote.

In Kaseke village in the Mondor area, at least 10 people were killed by security forces three weeks before the elections. Villagers were told that the soldiers had instructions to eliminate Mujibas, i.e., unemployed young people not at school.

In the Sipolilo area security forces asked the Kraal head to call a meeting for the purpose of teaching people how to vote. He refused to do so. The next day soldiers returned to the village and shot 15 people dead, including an infant and two children, aged 14 and nine years.

The human rights team said that although they found that the existence of intimidation by the authorities and the guerrillas was generally acknowledged, this was either dismissed as not having affected the result, or as being only what could be "expected in Africa."

Apart from specific incidents of coercion, a total climate of intimidation was created before and during the elections, according to the observers.

The starkest example of this was a striking montage they will reproduce in the report, showing bombers, helicopters, tanks and heavily armed soldiers, with a slogan: "Forward with Peace for the People--That is What the People Want."

The leaflet is addressed to "ZIPRA forces (Nkomo's supporters) and Mujibis: "Listen well, because this is your only warning. The Zimbabwe People's Army is everywhere, and if you try to stop the people from voting you will meet your death."

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SOUTH AFRICA

#### BRIEFS

MIRAGE SPARE PARTS--The British magazine "FLIGHT" reports in its latest issue that the South African Air Force can no longer use its Mirage F1 planes for lack of spare parts. The specialized British weekly reports that France, having finally decided to honor the UN arms embargo, has stopped delivery of Mirage F1 spare parts to South Africa. The air force is now having to depend on its other, older planes, the Dassault-Breguet and Mirage F3. According to the same magazine, Israel would be able to replace France for supply of Mirage F3 parts, because during the French embargo following the Six-Day War Israel developed a very similar aircraft, the "Kfir." [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 16 Apr 79 p 6]

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